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Abstract 
System reliability is usually predicted with the assumption that all component states are 
independent. This assumption may not accurate for systems with outsourced components since 
their states are strongly dependent and component details may be unknown. The purpose of this 
study is to develop an accurate system reliability method that can produce complete joint 
probability density function (PDF) of all the component states, thereby leading to accurate system 
reliability predictions. The proposed method works for systems whose failures are caused by 
excessive loading. In addition to the component reliability, system designers also ask for partial 
safety factors for shared loadings from component suppliers. The information is then sufficient for 
building a system-level joint PDF. Algorithms are designed for a component supplier to generate 
partial safety factors. The method enables accurate system reliability predictions without requiring 
proprietary information from component suppliers. 
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1. Introduction 
System reliability is the ability that a system performs its intended function. It is often measured 
by the probability that the system can work properly without any failure. Since a system is 
composed of multiple components, its reliability depends on the reliability of each component. 
Accurate system reliability prediction requires the joint probability density function (PDF) of all 
the component states. It is difficult or even impossible to obtain the joint PDF. For this reason, the 
system reliability is commonly approximated with the assumption that all component states are 
independent.  
In this work, we mainly focus on series systems since they are very common in engineering 
applications. For a series system consisting of n components, the assumption gives 
 
1
n
s i
i
R R

   (1) 
where sR  is the system reliability, and iR  is the reliability of component i.  
The independence assumption is particularly useful for systems whose components are 
outsourced. Outsourcing is a common practice as many industrial firms, such as automakers, 
function as system integrators, relying on various outside component suppliers. For example, 
numerous parts of vehicles are designed and manufactured outside except engines and powertrains 
that the automaker wants to keep in-house. This practice has resulted in huge cost savings in 
developing new products [1, 2]. During the system design stage, system designers can easily 
estimate the system reliability using Eq. (1) after they obtain component reliability iR  
( 1,2 ,,i n  ) from component suppliers. The independence assumption does not require system 
designers to know component design details [3, 4], which in most cases are proprietary to 
component suppliers. When the component reliability is predicted with physics-based reliability 
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methods, the component design details include component limit-state functions that specify the 
component states (safe or failed) [5]. 
The major drawback of the independence assumption method is the poor accuracy when 
component states are strongly dependent. This is often the case for mechanical systems. 
Components in a mechanical system may share the same random operation conditions, such as 
excessive stresses, making component failures highly dependent. Eq. (1) is actually the worst-case 
system reliability when component states are positively dependent. (This is the case for most 
mechanical applications.) The best-case system reliability is equal to the worst component 
reliability 1,2, ,min{ }ii nR    under the assumption that all component failures are completely 
dependent. Then the error of the system reliability prediction without knowing the system joint 
PDF is given by [6]  
 
1
min{ },   ( 1,2 , )
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i
R R R i n

   ⋯   (2) 
The above reliability bound may be too wide to make any useful decisions. To narrow this 
bound, Ditlevsen [7] proposed a method to obtain series system reliability bounds with the 
involvement of both unicomponent probabilities and bicomponent probabilities. Zhang [8] 
generalized this method by introducing joint probabilities of larger sets of components. Both 
methods require complete limit-state functions of all the components, making them not applicable 
for systems with outsourced components. Song and Der Kiureghian [9, 10] applied Linear 
Programming (LP) to compute the optimal bounds for system reliability based on any level of 
given information, such as incomplete component probabilities or inequality constrains on 
component probabilities.  An approximate LP algorithm, however, may not perform well for over-
constrained problems. Then based on the LP algorithm, Kang and Song developed a matrix-based 
system reliability (MSR) method [11], which makes it possible to produce narrow bounds for the 
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probability of system failure. Simplifying the system event in a matrix form, the MSR method can 
estimate system reliability accurately even in the case where the component probabilities and/or 
the statistical dependence are incomplete. This method still requires the distributions of input 
random variables and may not work well for systems with outsourced components.     
To address this issue, Hu and Du [12, 13] proposed a physics-based reliability method for 
component adopted in new series systems. The method reconstructs component limit-state 
functions at the system-level using limited reliability information. This method is able to build the 
joint PDF of the component states, thereby estimating system reliability with high accuracy. It 
requires, however, reliability functions with respect to the system load, which increases the burden 
of component reliability analysis on the component supplier side. To fix this problem, a new 
method [14] was developed to rebuild an equivalent component limit-state function under new 
conditions without knowing the relationship between the reliability and load. But this method may 
be inefficient for systems with more than two shared loads among components.  
Many other reliability methods can also be used for the system reliability prediction. Yu and 
Wang [15] proposed a reliability assessment approach by combining the extreme value moment 
method and the improved maximum entropy method for systems with multiple failure modes. 
Recently, they also developed a novel time-variant reliability analysis method based on failure 
process decomposition for dynamic systems [16] and a kernel density function based on the 
uncertainty quantification method for estimating the reliability of a robotic device [17]. Youn and 
Wang [18] developed a complementary intersection method (CIM) for series system reliability 
analysis. CIM makes it possible to use common reliability methods for efficiently calculating the 
probability of high-order joint failure events. This method was then extended to a more general 
form, referred to as the generalized complementary intersection method (GCIM) [19], and it can 
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be used for parallel and mixed systems. For system reliability assessment with multiple dependent 
failure events, an integrated performance measure approach (iPMA) was proposed [20]. iPMA 
employs Gaussian process regression to construct component surrogate models, which then 
enables system reliability prediction directly using Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS).  However, if 
the component limit-state functions or exact distributions of design variables are not available, 
these methods will not be applicable for system reliability evaluation with outsourced components.   
Some statistical-based methods are also widely used for system reliability evaluation, 
including Kriging Surrogate Modeling [21, 22], Linear Regression (LR) [23], Artificial Neural 
Network (ANN) [24], and Support Vector Machines (SVM) [25, 26]. Even with no component 
design details, these methods could reconstruct a precise decision boundary (response surface) of 
the component using training data. To evaluate the system reliability, however, they still require 
additional information from component suppliers.  
The objective of this work is to develop a new system reliability method linking both 
component-level and system-level analyses. At the component level, the proposed method enables 
component suppliers to provide enough information to system designers without revealing their 
component design details. At the system level, the proposed method helps system designers 
produce a complete joint PDF of all the component states, thereby leading to accurate system 
reliability prediction. Specifically, the major approach we use in the proposed method is the 
employment of partial safety factors (PSFs), which are specified by component suppliers for 
shared loads from the system with physics-based reliability. Then system designers use the PSFs 
from component suppliers to rebuild equivalent component limit-state functions [27-29], which in 
turn produce the joint PDF that is necessary for the system reliability prediction.  
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Basic methodologies used in this work are 
reviewed in Section 2. The overview of the proposed methods is given in Section 3. The system-
level analysis is discussed in Section 4 followed by component-level analysis in Section 5. In 
Section 6 the complete procedure of the proposed method is described. Two examples are 
discussed in Section 7. Conclusions are given in Section 8. 
2. Methodology Review 
The proposed method can employ any physics-based reliability methods, including First-Order 
Reliability Method (FORM), Second-Order Reliability Method (SORM), and MCS. The methods 
are briefly reviewed in Section 2.1. We also review the concept of PSF in Section 2.2.    
2.1 First Order Reliability Method (FORM) 
FORM linearizes a limit-state function ( )g X  using the first order Taylor expansion.  
Step 1: Transform random variables into standard normal variables 
Assume that all random variables in 1 2( , , , )nX X XX ⋯  are independent. The random 
variables in X  are transformed into standard normal random variables 1 2( , , , )nU U UU = ⋯  by [30] 
 ( ) ( ) 1,2, , )i ii X UF ni   ⋯   (3) 
where ( )iF   and ( )   are the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of iX  and iU , respectively. 
Then  
 1 ( ) )( 1,2, , )ii iF T nX U iU
      ⋯   (4)  
in which ( )T   denotes the transformation operation.  
Step 2: Search for the Most Probable Point (MPP) 
fp  is computed by 
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in which ( )U u  is the joint PDF of U . 
FORM linearizes ( ( ))g T U  using an expansion point u  obtained from 
 
min
s.t.  ( ( )) 0
T
g T
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
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

U
UU
U
  (6) 

u  is the MPP, and its magnitude is called the reliability index and is given by  
  T   u u  (7) 
With the first Taylor expansion series, ( ( ))g T U  is approximated at u  as  
 ( ( )) ( ( )) ( )( ) ( )( )
T Tg T g T g g        U u u U u u U u  (8) 
where ( )g
 u  is the gradient of ( ( ))g T U  at u and is given by 
 
1 2
( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))
( ) , , ,
n
g T g T g T
g
U U U 
           u
U U U
u ⋯   (9) 
Set a unit vector   as 
 
( )
( )
g
g




u
u 
    (10) 
Then u  is represented by 
   u    (11) 
Substituting Eqs. (10) and (11) into Eq. (8) and multiplying both sides of Eq. (8) by 
1
( )g  u 
 
yields a new limit-state function 
 
( ( ))
( )
( )
g T
G
g
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U
U U
u 
   (12) 
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Step 3: Compute fp  
Using the new limit-state function in Eq. (12), fp  is calculated by 
  Pr ( ) 0 ( )fp G    U   (13) 
Since FORM is based on the first order Taylor expansion, it is accurate when the component 
limit-state function is not highly nonlinear. Otherwise, SORM may be a better choice.  
2.2 Second Order Reliability Method (SORM) 
SORM uses the second order Taylor expansion to approximate ( )g X  at the MPP, which is 
given by 
 
2
( ( )) ( ) ( )( )
1
                + ( ) ( )( )
2
g T g g
g
  
  
  
  
U u u U u
U u u U u
 (14) 
where ( )g
 u  is given in Eq. (9) and 2 ( )g  u  is the Hessian matrix. Since there is no closed-
form expression for fp  [31], an orthogonal transformation Y HU  is conducted. This 
transformation rotates the U-space into a new set of mutually independent standard normal 
variables Y  with nY  coincident with the MPP vector. Matrix H  is an orthogonal matrix and is 
obtained by a Gram-Schmidt [32] orthogonalization. Then the approximated limit-state function 
is rewritten as  
 
1
( ) ( ) ( )
2
T
nYG 
      Y Y y M Y y  (15) 
where (0,0, , )
T y ⋯  is the Y-space MPP corresponding to the u , and M  is the transformed 
Hessian matrix and is given by 
 
2 ( )
( )
Tg
g




u
M = H H
u 
 (16) 
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After a series of orthogonal transformations, with the first 1n   variables being
1 2 1( , , , )
T
nY y y y  ⋯ , the first  ( 1) ( 1)n n    order matrix of M  becomes a diagonal matrix, and 
Eq. (15) becomes 
 
1
2
1
1
2
n
n i i
i
Y k y


    (17) 
where ik  represents the curvature of the response surface at the MPP, and finding ik  can be treated 
as an eigenvalue problem. 
The probability of failure is then estimated using Breitung’s formulation, which is given by  
 
1/21
, Breitung
1
( ) (1 )
n
f i
i
p k 


      (18) 
A more accurate expression is derived from Tvedt’s formulations which is given by [32] 
 , Breitung 1 2 3+fp A A A   (19) 
in which 
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  

 
 
  (20) 
where Re( )  denotes the real part of an imaginary number. 
2.3 Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) 
MCS is a sampling method. The procedure of MCS is below. 
1) Generate N  samples of X .  
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2) Calculate the response ( )g X  at samples of X , and then N  samples of ( )g X  are available.  
3) Count the number of samples of ( )g X  in the failure region ( ( ) 0g X ). Denote the number 
of failures by fN . The probability of failure is then given by 
 
f
f
N
p
N
   (21) 
2.4 Partial Safety Factor (PSF) 
PSFs are commonly used in modern structural design (limit state design), which affects the 
action values (loads) and the characteristic values of the material properties, and the satisfaction 
of certain ultimate and serviceability limit states [33]. To obtain a safe design, the acting loads and 
material properties are combined with specified PSFs. The PSF for a load, which is generally 
greater than unity, sets the design value of the load equal to the product of the PSF and the acting 
load (or desired load). The PSF for a material strength is usually less than unity. Multiplying the 
PSF by the material strength determines the permissible stress (strength) of the material. For 
example, a load acting on a cantilever beam is multiplied by a PSF > 1 to account for the variation 
of the load due to a sudden increase. Similarly, a PSF < 1 is applied to the characteristic stress of 
the material to ensure that sufficient strength is provided. 
In general, for a component with limit-state function ( )g X , the basic random variables in X  
include applied loads  1 2, , , pL L LL ⋯  and component strength S . With PSFs, the safe state of 
the component is specified by [34] 
 ( ) ( , ) 0
iS i L
g g    X   (22) 
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where 1   is the PSF (reduction factor of strength) for the strength, and i  is the PSF (partial 
load amplification factor) for load iL  ( 1,2 ,,i p  ); S  is the mean of S , and Li  is the mean 
of iL . 
With distributions of S  and iL  available, the PSFs   and i  could be easily computed. 
Assume that component suppliers use FORM for the reliability analysis, which produces the MPP 

u  and the reliability index  . The partial safety factors   and i  can be obtained by 
 
 1* ( )S S
S S
FS 

 
  
    (23) 
 
 1* ( )
i
i i
L Li
i
L L
FL 

 
  
    (24) 
in which *S  and *iL  are components of the MPP in in the X-space for S  and iL , respectively; S  
and 
iL
  are the directional cosine of S  and iL  in the U-space, respectively.  
If ( )g X  is not available to component suppliers, physics-based methods cannot be directly 
applied for the reliability analysis. In these cases, statistics-based methods, such as Support Vector 
Machine [35], are good choices to approximate the component limit-state function with limited 
observations; then   and i  will be available. 
3. System Reliability Prediction with PSFs 
The proposed system reliability method works for the following systems with outsourced 
components.  
1) System and component failures are caused by excessive stresses. 
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2) Components share a number of loads, which are the only common basic variables shared 
by component limit-state functions.  
3) A component may have multiple failure modes. 
4) System designer knows the distributions of loads distributed to components. 
5) System designers do not know component limit-state functions. 
6) System designers know component reliability provided by component suppliers. 
7) Component suppliers also provide PSFs they used in their component design to system 
designers. 
The basic strategy of the PSF method is that system designers construct equivalent component 
limit-state functions and convert them into a multivariate normal distribution, whose distribution 
parameters are estimated through the component reliability and component PSFs provided by 
component suppliers. Once the joint normal PDF is available, the system reliability can be easily 
estimated. 
It is therefore important for component suppliers to produce component reliabilities and PSFs. 
For the former, any physics-and statistics-based methods, such as FORM, SORM, MCS, SVM, 
and experiments can be used. For the latter, the proposed method relies on the concept of 
equivalent linear safety margin [27] to determine PSFs for components with multiple failure modes. 
The PSF method therefore involves both system- and component-level reliability analyses. 
Both of them are discussed in Sections 4 and 5. 
4. System-Level Analysis 
At the system analysis level, the task of system designers is to accurately predict system reliability 
with only the component reliability and corresponding PSFs.  
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Assume that the system consists of m  components and is subjected to multiple loads
 1 2, , , pL L LL ⋯ . Component probabilities of failure fip  and PSFs  ,1 ,2 ,, , ,i i i i p   ⋯  of 
 1 2, , , pL L LL ⋯ , 1, 2 ,,i m  , are provided by component suppliers.  
For component i, system designers construct an equivalent limit-state function no matter how 
many failure modes the component may have and what reliability method that the component 
supplier has used. With FORM, the equivalent limit-state function contains only shared load 
 1 2, , , pL L LL ⋯  in a linear form 
 
1 1, ,
( )
p pi i i L L i L L
G U U     U ⋯   (25) 
where i  is the reliability index given by 
 ( )i fip      (26) 
1 2
, , )( ,
pL L L L
U U U U  is the transformed vector of  1 2, , , pL L LL ⋯ , and , , 1, 2, ,ji L j p   , 
are coefficients. 
System designers can find , ji L  using PSFs ,i j . The equation is given by 
  1 1, ,( )j j ji L i L i j LF         (27) 
Eq. (27) can be easily derived if FORM is used by the component supplier. Since *, , ji j i j LL    
is the MPP component of iL  in the X-space, we have 
 * *,( ) ( )j jL i j LF L u    (28) 
in which ( )
jL
F   is the CDF of jL , and 
*
jL
u  is the MPP component of jL  in the U-space. According 
to Eq. (11) and 
,
*
,i j jL i L i
u    , Eq. (27) is rewritten as 
 * ,( ) ( )j jL j i L iF L       (29) 
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This leads to Eq. (27).  
Note that using FORM is not a prerequisite for the PSF method.  As will be discussed in Section 
5, other reliability methods can also be used.   
Since the components of U  follow standard normal distributions, the limit-state function 
( )
i
G U  with respect to U  also follows a normal distribution with the mean value of i  and 
standard deviation of 1. Thus, the joint PDF of all the component states in Eq. (25) follows a 
multivariate normal distribution with the joint PDF ( ) G  determined by the mean vector μ and 
covariance matrix Σ . μ is given by 
 1 2 ,( ), , m     μ ⋯  (30) 
and Σ  is given by 
 
12 1
21 2
1 2
1
1
1
m
m
m m m m
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Σ
⋯
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
⋯
 (31) 
in which ij is the correlation coefficient between the i-th and j-th component states and is 
calculated by 
 , ,
1
i L
p
ij p j p
k
L 

   (32) 
With the obtained μ and Σ , ( ) G  is given by 
    11 1exp
2(2
(
)
)
T
n


    
 
G v v Σ v 

 (33) 
The system reliability is calculated by 
 ( d ( );) msR 

   G v v μ Σ  (34) 
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where );(m μ Σ  is the CDF of ( )G v , v  is a m-dimensional random vector, and   is the 
system safe region defined by 
  0 | ( )i mG i     U U ⋯  (35) 
The system probability of failure is then given by 
 1fs sp R   (36) 
5. Component-Level Analysis 
As discussed above, the task of a component supplier is to provide the component reliability and 
PSFs of the shared loads to system designers. We now discuss the proposed method for doing so. 
A component may fail due to multiple failure modes. For each failure mode the component 
supplier could use various methods to obtain the component reliability. 
Given component i with q  failure modes and the limit-state functions
, , ~ ,( ) ( ) ( 1, 2 , )i k i i k i L LG g k q U U U ⋯ , where iU  is the vector of the basic variables, LU  is the 
vector of the shared loads, and ~i LU  is the vector of  iU  without LU  in the U-space. We at first 
discuss the case where FORM is used. The approximated limit-state functions by FORM are given 
by 
 
1 1, , , 1 ~ 1 , ,
( ) ,  1, 2 ,
p pi k i k i k i L i kL iL i kL iL
G U U U k q            U ⋯ ⋯ ⋯  (37) 
where ,i k   is the reliability index of the k-th failure mode, and 1, , 1 , ,( , , , , )pi k i k i kL i kL      ⋯ ⋯  is 
the directional cosine. If one failure mode occurs, the entire component fails. As a result, the 
component is regarded as a series system. The reliability is then given by 
 ,( )k ii iR   μ Σ  (38) 
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where 1 2, ,( , )i i i iq     μ ⋯  and , ,[ ]kj
T
i i k i j   Σ    ( , 1, 2, , )k j q ⋯ . The reliability index of 
the component is therefore given by 
  1i iR   (39) 
Each component failure mode has its own PSFs for the shared loads. To enable the component 
supplier to produce PSFs for the entire component with a single limit-state function, we employ 
the method of the equivalent linear safety margin discussed in [27], which is given by 
 
1 1,1 1~ , ,
( )
p pi i i L i L L i L L
G U U U        U ⋯ ⋯  (40) 
Eq. (40) represents only one limit-state function no matter how many failure modes a 
component may have. The coefficients of the random variables on the right-hand side are 
determined by the sensitivity of i  with respect to the basic random variables.  
 , 1
1
/2
2
,  1,2, ,
i
j
i
i
n
j
j j
U
n
U
j






 
        


 (41) 
The derivatives in Eq. (41) are evaluated numerically. Increase jU ,  1, 2 ,,j n  , by a small 
step size 0j   , and let (0, , , ,0)j j  ε . Since jU  is a standard normal variable, j  is set to 
0.01j  , or one percent of the standard deviation [36], which is used for both examples in this 
work. The new basic variables then become 
 2 1 11 , , ,( , , , )j j j j nUU U U U U   U  (42) 
This gives a new reliability index ,i j  by 
  1, 1 ( )i j i i j      ε  (43) 
The derivative is then given by 
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,i j ii
jU
 




  (44) 
Since the counterpart in the X-space of the MPP of jL  is calculated by 
*
, jj i j L
L   and in the 
U-space the MPP is given by * , jj i i Lu    , the component PSFs for the shared loads are computed 
by  
 
 1 ,
,
( )
  ( 1,2, , )
j j
j
L i i L
i j
L
F
j p
 


  
  ⋯  (45) 
Then component suppliers provide the component reliability iR  and PSFs ,i j  to system 
designers. iR  and ,i j  do not include proprietary information such as component limit-state 
functions, which may involve component structures, dimensions, and material properties.  
Note that although the above discussions are based on FORM, other reliability methods can 
also be used. If SORM is used, the procedure will be the same. Component suppliers only need to 
replace i  obtained by FORM with that by SORM. 
6. Complete Procedure 
We now discuss the complete procedure of using the PSF method. The procedure consists 
component-level and stem-level analyses. First, we summarize the information known at both 
levels. 
1) Component-level: the limit-state functions , ( )i kg X  for the k-th failure mode of the i-th 
component, and the distributions of X (including the basic random variables and system loads). 
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2) System-level: the probability of failure of each component fip , the PSF ,i j  for each 
system load, and the distributions of system loads. The former two pieces of information are 
produced by the component-level analysis. 
The flowchart of the complete procedure is then provided as shown in Fig.1. 
------------------------------- 
Place Figure 1 here  
------------------------------- 
 
7. Examples 
In this section, the PSF method is applied to two examples. The first mathematical example is used 
to demonstrate the procedure of using the proposed method for system reliability estimation while 
the other example shows an engineering application.   
7.1 A mathematical example 
A system consists of two components, and each component has two failure modes (FMs). The 
components are provided by two different outside suppliers. We now discuss the proposed method 
through both component-level and system-level analysis. 
7.1.1 Component-level analysis 
Component 1 has two limit-state functions for FM1 and FM2, respectively, which are given 
by 
 1 1,2 1,31,1 1,1( ) 452 8.6 3.6g X X X    X    (46) 
 
3 2
1,2 11 1,3,1 1,2( ) 1035 2 3g X X X    X    (47) 
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The independent basic random variables are 1 1,1 1,2 1,3 1,1( , , ) ( , )X X X X X L , and 1 2( , )L LL  
contains two shared loads. Their distributions are given in Table 1, in which N means Normal 
Distribution. 
------------------------------- 
Place Table 1 here  
------------------------------- 
 
The supplier uses FORM for reliability analysis for FM1 and obtains the approximated limit-
state function given by 
 
1 1 2 21,1 1,1 1,1 1,1 1 1,11,11 1
( ) L L L LG U U U       U  (48) 
where 1,1 3.1614   , 1,11 0.5179  , 11,1 0.4065L   , and 21,1 0.7527L   . The probability of failure 
is 
4
1,1 1,1( ) 7.8498 10fp 
     .  
For FM2, the suppliers applies SORM due to the higher nonlinearity. Then the reliability index 
and corresponding directional cosine are obtained by 1,2 3.3435   , 1,21 0.7012  , 
11,2
0.7006L   , and 21,2 0.1320L    . The approximated linear limit-state function is given by 
 
1 1 2 21,2 1,2 1,1 1,2 1,21,21
( ) L L L LG U U U       U  (49) 
The probability of failure is 
4
1,2 1,2( ) 4.1359 10fp 
     . 
Since the joint PDF of 1,1( )G U  and 1,2 ( )G U  follows multivariate normal distribution with the 
mean 1μ  given by 
 1,1 1,1 2, ) ( 3.1614, 3.34( 35)      μ  (50) 
and 1Σ  given by 
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12
1
21
1 1 0.5485
1 0.5485 1


   
    
  
Σ  (51) 
Thus, the probability of failure of component 1 is calculated by 
 1 1
3
1 21 ( ) 1.1650 10fp
     μ Σ  (52) 
The corresponding reliability index is 
1
1 1( ) 3.0446fp
   . 
The component supplier also needs to provide the PSFs for the system load 1 2( , )L LL  to 
system designers. Now we discuss how the component supplier obtains the PSFs using the 
equivalent linear safety margin approach [28].  
The component equivalent reliability index is 1 . Set 0.01  , with 1 0,0    , we have 
 
1 2
1 2
1,111,1
1 1
1,1
1
1,2 1,21
1,1
1,2 1,2
0
0
0.01
3.1614 0.5179 3.1666
          
0.4065 0.7527
0.7006 0.132
         = 0
3.3435 0.7012 0
0
L L
L L
T T
 



 
                     
 
                  

 



  
3.3505
 
 
 
  (53) 
According to Eq. (43), the new reliability index is  
  11,1 2 11( ) 1 ( 3.1666, 3.3505 ) 3.0506       Σ   (54) 
Therefore,  
 
1
1,1 1 11
1,1
0
( ) 3.0506 3.0446
0.6051
0.01


 


 
   
 

 (55) 
Similarly, with 2 0,   , we have 
  
1
1
1, 2 12( ) 1 ( 3.1655, 3.3505 ) 3.0499L
      Σ  (56) 
Therefore, 
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 1
1
2
1, 21
1,2 1,
0
1
( ) 3.0499 3.0446
0.5292
0.01
L
L

 
 


 
    
 

 (57) 
Likewise, with 3 0,0,   , we have 
  
2
1
1, 3 12( ) 1 ( 3.1690, 3.3422 ) 3.0492L
      Σ  (58) 
Thus,  
 2
2
3
1, 31
1,3 1,
0
1
( ) 3.0492 3.0446
0.4586
0.01
L
L

 
 


 
    
 

 (59) 
By normalizing 1,1 1,2 1,3( , , )   , we obtain a unit vector of (0.6538,0.5718,0.4955) . Note that
11,2 1,L
   and 
21,3 1,L
  , the equivalent safety margin of component 1 is given by 
 
1 1 2 2 1 21 1,1 1,11 1, 1, 1,1
( ) 3.0446 0.6538 0. 0.49555718L L L L L LG U U U U U U          U  (60) 
The partial safety factors 1,1  for load 1L  is then calculated by 
 
 
1 1
1
1
1 1,
1,1
( ) 27.3884
= 0.9129
30
L L
L
F  


  
   (61) 
Similarly, the partial safety factors 1,2  for load 2L  is calculated by 
 
 
2 2
2
1
1 1,
1,2
( ) 284.9148
0.9497
300
L L
L
F  


  
     (62) 
Then the supplier of component 1 provides 
3
1 1.1650 10fp
  , 1,1 0.9129  , and 1,2 0.9497   
to system designers. 
Component 2 also has two limit-state functions given by 
 
2
2,1 2,2 2,3 22 ,4( ) 2 3 17g X X X  X  (63) 
 
2
2,2 2,2 , 2 42 2 3 ,( ) 2g X X X  X  (64) 
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The independent basic random variables are 2 2,2 2,3 2,4 2,41 2( , , ) ( , , )X X X L L X X , in which 
1 2
( , )L L  are the same shared loads as those in FM1. Their distributions are given in Table 2. 
 
------------------------------- 
Place Table 2 here  
------------------------------- 
 
The supplier of component 2 uses FORM to conduct reliability analysis for both failure modes. 
They obtain the component probability of failure 
 
4
2 22 21 ( ) 6.8864 10fp
    μ Σ    (65) 
in which 2,1 2,2 2, ) ( 3.2559, 3.28( 48)      μ  and 
2
1 0.9799
0.9799 1
 
  
 
Σ . 
The equivalent reliability index is given by 
 
1
2 2( ) 3.1994fp
      (66) 
The partial safety factor 2,1  for load 1L  is calculated by 
 
 
1 1
1
1
2 2
2,1
( ) 25.3615
= 0.8454
30
L L
L
F  


  
     (67) 
and  2,2  for load 2L  is given by 
 
 
1 2
2
1
2 2
2,2
( ) 307.0055
= 1.0234
300
L L
L
F  


  
     (68) 
Then 2
46.8864 10fp
 , 2,1 0.8454  ， and  2,2 1.0234   are provided to system designers. 
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7.1.2 System-level analysis 
To calculate the system reliability, system designers need to find the joint PDF of components 
1 and 2. As discussed in Sec. 4, the joint PDF follows a multivariate normal distribution. The task 
of the system designers is therefore to find the mean vector μ and covariance matrix Σ . With the 
given 1fp  and 2fp , μ is obtained by 
 
1 1
1 2, )( ( ) ( ) 3.0446 3.1994( , )f fp p
      μ  (69) 
and Σ  is determined by  
 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1, 1, 2, 2,
1, 1, 2, 2,
( , )( , )
( , )( , )
1 1 0.4442
0.4442 11
T
L L L L
T
L L L L
   
   
   
    
   
Σ  (70) 
where , ( , 1,2)ji L i j   is calculated by 
  
1 1 1
1 1
1, 1 1,1( ) 0.5718L L LF   
      (71) 
  
2 2 2
1 1
1, 1 1,2( ) 0.4955L L LF   
      (72) 
  
1 1 1
1 1
2, 2 2,1( ) 0.9665L L LF   
      (73) 
  
2 2 2
1 1
2, 2 2,2( ) 0.2190L L LF   
       (74) 
Thus the system probability of failure is given by 
 2
31 ( ) 1.8206 10fsp
    μ Σ  (75) 
7.1.3 Result validation 
To validate the result from the PSF method, we calculate the true fsp  using MCS method as 
if all the component design details, including all the component limit-state functions and the 
information in Tables 1 and 2, were available. For comparison, we also compute fsp  using the 
independence assumption method, which is given by 
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 1,in, d 2,ind1 (1 ) (1 )fs in fd fp p p     (76) 
in which 
 
3
1,ind 11 121 (1 ) (1 ) 1.1982 10f f fp p p
        (77) 
 
3
2,ind 21 221 (1 ) (1 ) 1.0751 10f f fp p p
        (78) 
Plugging Eqs. (77) and (78) into Eq. (76), we have 
 ,
32.2721 10fs indp
   (79) 
The results from different methods are summarized in Table 3, which indicates that the PSF 
method produces much higher accuracy than the independence assumption method. The accuracy 
is measured by the relative error with respect to the MCS solution. The dependency between 
components is automatically accommodated in the proposed method. The large error from 
independence assumption method is mainly caused by the high correlation between component 
states. 
------------------------------- 
Place Table 3 here  
------------------------------- 
7.2 An engineering example 
A hoisting device has two components as shown in Fig. 2. Component 1 consists of two ropes.  
Two loads 1L  and 2L  are applied to Component 1. 1L  and 2L  are independent, and the mean 
value of 2L  is much bigger than that of 1L . Component 2 is a truss structure and is composed of 
two rods. Components 1 and 2 are designed and manufactured by two independent outside 
suppliers, and no design details are available to the system-level analysis. System designers request 
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the component suppliers to perform reliability analysis under the system loads 1L  and 2L  and to 
provide component reliabilities and PSFs for the loads. 
------------------------------- 
Place Figure 2 here  
------------------------------- 
 
7.2.1 Component-level analysis 
Component 1 has two failure modes due to failures of ropes 1 and 2. The corresponding two 
limit-state functions are given by 
 1 2
1,1 11 2
1
( )
/ 4
L L
g S
d

 X  (80) 
 2
1,2 1 2 2
2
( )
/ 4
L
g S
d
 X  (81) 
The distributions of random variables known by the suppliers of Component 1 are given in 
Table 4, in which LogN stands for a lognormal distribution. 
------------------------------- 
Place Table 4 here  
------------------------------- 
 
The supplier of Component 1 uses FORM for FM1 and then obtains the reliability index 
1,1 3.8555   , and directional cosines 11,1 0.1604L     and 21,1 0.9451L     with respect to 1L  
and 2L , respectively. The probability of failure is computed by 
5
11 1,1( ) 5.7744 10fp 
     .  
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The supplier then uses SORM for FM2 and obtains 1,2 3.2802   , 11,2 0L   , and 
21,2
0.6989L    . The probability of failure is then given by 
4
1,2 1,2( ) 5.1873 10fp 
     . 
The joint PDF of FM1 and FM2 is then determined by the mean 
 1,1 1,1 2, ) ( 3.8555, 3.28( 02)      μ  (82) 
and the covariance matrix  
 1
1 0.6604
0.6604 1
 
  
 
Σ  (83) 
Thus, the probability of failure of Component 1 is calculated by 
 
4
1 11 21 ( ) 5.6356 10fp
    μ Σ   (84) 
The corresponding reliability index is 
1
1 1( ) 3.2567fp
   . 
Based on the equivalent limit-state function of Component 1, the PSFs 1,1  for 1L  and 1,2  for 
2
L  are calculated and are given by 1,1 1.0064   and 1,2 1.4418  . The supplier then provides 1fp , 
1,1  and 1,2  to system designers. 
The two failure modes of Component 2 are caused by excessive axial stresses developed in 
Rods 1 and 2. The limit-state functions for the two failure modes are given by 
 
 
1 2 2
2,1
2 2
2 1
2 3
2
3
(
)
8 )
(
L L a
g
a
S
da 


X   (85) 
  
 
1 2 1
2,2
2 2
2 1
2 4
2
4
(
)
8 )
(
L L a
g
a
S
da 


X   (86) 
The distributions of random variables are given in Table 5.  
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------------------------------- 
Place Table 5 here  
------------------------------- 
 
The supplier of Component 2 applies FORM to both failure modes and obtains the reliability 
index and directional cosines for the loads. For FM1, the supplier obtains 2,1 2.7199   , 
12,1
0.1907L    , and 22,1 0.9299L    . For FM2, the results are 2,2 2.8845   , 12,2 0.1789L    , 
and 
22,2
0.8697L    . The probability of failure is then calculated by 
3
2 22 21 ( ) 4.3144 10fp
    μ Σ , and the reliability index is 12 2( ) 2.6264fp
   . The 
PSFs 2,1 1.0610   for load 1L  and 2,2 1.4506   for load 2L  are also obtained. The supplier then 
provides 2fp , 2,1 , and 2,2  to system designers. 
7.2.2 System-level analysis 
With the provided component probabilities of failure 1fp , and 2fp ; PSFs 1,1 , 1,2 , 2,1  and 
2,2  for the system loads, system designers build the joint CDF of Components 1 and 2, which 
follows a multivariate normal distribution with the mean  
 
1 1
1 2, )( ( ) ( ) 3.2567 2.6264( , )f fp p
      μ   (87) 
and the covariance matrix  
 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1, 1, 2, 2,
1, 1, 2, 2,
( , )( , ) 0.7072
0.7072( , )(
1 1
11, )
T
L L L L
T
L L L L
   
   
   
    
   
Σ   (88) 
where , ( , 1,2)ji L i j   is given by 
  
1 1 1
1 1
1, 1 1,1( ) 0.0163L L LF   
       (89) 
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  
2 2 2
1 1
1, 1 1,2( ) 0.7462L L LF   
       (90) 
  
1 1 1
1 1
2, 2 2,1( ) 0.1937L L LF   
       (91) 
  
2 2 2
1 1
2, 2 2,2( ) 0.9435L L LF   
       (92) 
Thus the system probability of failure is given by 
 2
31 ( ) 4.6386 10fsp
    μ Σ   (93) 
7.2.3 Result validation 
We also calculate the true system probability of failure using MCS method and the 
independence assumption method, and the results are shown in Table 6. 
The results show that the proposed method outperforms the independence assumption method 
with a relatively higher accuracy even with limited information available for system reliability 
analysis. 
------------------------------- 
Place Table 6 here  
------------------------------- 
8. Conclusions 
This works develops a new system reliability method to accurately estimate product reliability 
with only component reliability and partial safety factors for shared system loads. The new method 
provides a solution to the challenge for accurate system reliability prediction when component 
design details are not available to system designers due to outsourcing. Two case studies 
demonstrate that the proposed method is more accurate than the traditional independence 
assumption method that neglects the dependence between component states. The new strategy is 
for system designers to construct equivalent component limit-state functions using the partial 
31 
 
safety factors for shared system loads provided by component suppliers. Then the joint probability 
density function of all the component states is obtained at the system level, thereby leading to an 
accurate system reliability prediction without revealing proprietary details of outsourced 
components. 
The proposed method is applicable to series systems whose failures are caused by excessive 
stresses due to random loads. The major assumption of the proposed method is that the shared 
loads are only common random variables between the components of the system. If there are other 
common variables, the proposed method can still work as long as the corresponding partial safety 
factors are produced and provided by component suppliers. 
The proposed method can be extended to other system configurations, including parallel 
systems, mixed systems, and linked networks. Equivalent component limit-state functions can be 
generated the same way, but the final calculation of the system reliability will be different. The 
joint probability of component failures for the system reliability estimation will depends on the 
specific system configuration or the logic relationships between the system and component states. 
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Table 1 Distribution of basic random variables 
Variable Distribution 
1,1X   210, 0.8N  
11,2 ( )X L   230,1.5N  
21,3( )X L   2300,10N  
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Table 2 Distribution of basic random variables 
Variable Distribution 
2,2 1( )X L   230,1.5N  
22,3 ( )X L   2300,10N  
2,4X   220, 2N  
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Table 3 Results from different methods 
 PSF 
Independence 
Assumption 
True Value 
fsp  
31.8206 10  
32.2721 10  31.7689 10  
Error (%) 2.92 28.44 N/A 
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Table 4 Distribution of basic random variables 
Random variables Distribution 
1,1 1 ( )X d : diameter of rope 1  3 4 25 10 , (1 10 )  mN      
21,2  ( )X d : diameter of rope 2  3 4 24 10 , (1 10 )  mN      
1,3 1 ( )X S : resistance of rope 1  270,1  MPaN  
1,4 2 ( )X S : resistance of rope 2  295,12  MPaN  
11,5  ( )X L : load 1  2250,30  NlogN  
21,6  ( )X L : load 2  2550,100  NlogN  
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Table 5 Distribution of basic random variables 
Random variables Distribution 
2,1 1 ( )X a : length of Rod 1  240.9, (1 10 )  mN    
2,2 2 ( )X a : length of Rod 2  241.8, (1 10 )  mN    
2,3 3 ( )X d : diameter of Rod 1  3 4 26 10 , 1 10  mN       
2,4 4 ( )X d : diameter of Rod 2  3 4 26 10 , (1 10 )  mN      
2,5 3 ( )X S : resistance of Rod 1  295,3  MPaN  
2,6 4 ( )X S : resistance of Rod 2  250,3  MPaN  
12,7  ( )X L : load 1  2250,30  NlogN  
22,8  ( )X L : load 2  2550,100  NlogN  
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Table 6 Results from different methods 
 PSF 
Independence 
Assumption 
True Value 
fsp  
34.6386 10  
35.7917 10  34.8540 10  
Error (%) 4.43  19.32  N/A 
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Fig. 1 Flowchart of the proposed method 
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Fig. 2 A hoisting device 
 
